Interest rates in China

　　中國的利率

　　A small step forward

　　向前一小步

　　Chinas central bank has liberalised lending rates.Does it matter?

　　中國的央行放開了借貸利率，這有用嗎?

　　NOBODY can accuse the Peoples Bank of China , Chinas central bank, of beinggun-shy. A few weeks ago its clumsy attempt to restrain dodgier forms of bank lending ledto a bout of market panic. Many said the episode would chill enthusiasm for furtherexperimentation.

　　沒人能指責作為中國央行的中國人民銀行行動慎重。幾周之前，央行笨拙地試探了收緊銀行貸款，這引起了市場的一陣恐慌。許多人表示這會降低進一步作出改革的熱情。

　　But on July 20th the PBOC experimented again. On that day the central bank ended allrestrictions on lending rates, which previously had a floor of 70% of the PBOC benchmarkrate. Banks are now free to set lending rates at anylevel they want.

　　但是在7月20日的時候，中國人民銀行又做出了改革。當天，央行放開了借貸利率的限制，之前的標準是借貸利率不得低于央行標準額的0.7倍。現(xiàn)在銀行可以自由設(shè)定貸款利率了。對住房抵押貸款的人來說是好消息。

　　In truth, the measure is less bold than it appears. The interest-rate reform that everyone iswaiting for is liberalisation of deposit rates. Chinas policy of financial repression has cappedthe rate that banks can pay depositors, even as it put a floor on the rate at which they mustlend. That has guaranteed fat profits for the big state banks, like Bank of China and theIndustrial and Commercial Bank of China, that dominate the financial system.

　　事實上，這個措施沒有看起來那么大膽。人們想要的利率改革是存款利率的放開。中國的金融壓制政策限定了銀行給存款者的最高利率，正如也設(shè)定了貸款利率一樣。這個政策保證了大型國有銀行，例如中國銀行，中國工商銀行的豐厚利潤，同時他們也主導了金融體系。

　　The liberalisation of lending rates may be a half-measure, but officials still hope it willincrease competition among banks and spur lending to the corporate sector, especially toprivate firms that have long been starved of capital. Sceptics point out that the PBOC movedthe floor for the lending rate from 90% of its benchmark to 70% a year ago, but Chinesebanks did not rush to lend below the 90% mark. That suggests they are unlikely to cut ratesnow.

　　放開貸款利率只算是半個措施。但是官方依然希望這會增加銀行間的競爭，促進資金流向企業(yè)部門，尤其是長期缺乏資金的私人公司。懷疑者指出一年前中國人民銀行將貸款利率的下限由基準利率的90%下調(diào)到70%，而中國的銀行并沒有馬上做出調(diào)整。那意味著銀行并不想馬上下調(diào)利率。

　　A rival view argues that borrowers with strong bargaining power, such as big state-ownedenterprises , will now be emboldened to push the big banks for cheaper loans. Somesuggest that non-performing loans at SOEs may be rolled over at negligible interest rates,disguising what is, in effect, a state bail-out.

　　相反的觀點是借貸者議價能力很強，像一些大型的國有企業(yè)，他們現(xiàn)在會有膽量讓銀行調(diào)低利率。一些人表示國企的不良貸款會延期償還，利率也會很低，實際上相當于國家紓困。

　　On this view, as lower rates eat into their profits the big banks will be forced to look forhigher-margin opportunities at the small and medium-sized private firms that they havelong ignored. That in turn will put them in direct competition with smaller, private-sectorjoint-stock banks, such as China Merchants and China Minsheng, that have focused on thisarea.

　　從這個角度看，低利率會啃食大型銀行的利潤，他們會將目光轉(zhuǎn)移到長期忽視的中小企業(yè)身上，貸款給這些企業(yè)利潤更高。這會使他們與長期參與中小企業(yè)貸款的小型私營股份制銀行產(chǎn)生直接競爭，比如中國招商銀行，中國民生銀行。

　　If so, Chinas banks may be about to enter a rocky period. ChinaScope Financial, a researchfirm, has analysed how increased competition and declining net interest margins willaffect banks operating in China. The boffins conclude that the smallest local outfits, knownas city commercial banks, and the middling private-sector banks will be hit hardest, but thatreturns on equity at the big five state banks will also be squeezed . They think theindustry will need $50 billion-100 billion in extra capital over the next two years to keep itscapital ratios stable.

　　這樣的話，中國的銀行可能會進入動蕩期。數(shù)庫財務(wù)咨詢有限公司分析了競爭的增加和凈利息差幅的減少會影響中國銀行的運行。研究人員得出結(jié)論：小型的地方商業(yè)銀行和中等私營股份制銀行最慘，五大行的權(quán)益回報率也會壓縮。他們認為接下來的兩年中，銀行業(yè)需要500億到1000億美元的額外資金保證其資本比率穩(wěn)定。

　　The bigger worry for Chinas state banks is the signal sent by the PBOCs move. The centralbank has affirmed its commitment to reform. If those reforms include the liberalisation ofdeposit rates, then something far more serious than a minor profit squeeze will befallChinas banks. Guaranteed profitability would end; banks would have to compete forcustomers; and risk management would suddenly matter. In short, Chinese bankers wouldhave to start working for a living.

　　中國國有銀行最大的擔憂是央行的行動所發(fā)出的信號。央行確認要進行改革。如果改革措施包括放開存款利率，那么中國銀行業(yè)會面臨一個比利潤壓縮更嚴重的危機。收益保證將會終結(jié)。銀行需要爭奪客戶，風險管理突然變得很重要。總而言之，中國的銀行從業(yè)人員需要認真干活了。

　　Interest rates in China

　　中國的利率

　　A small step forward

　　向前一小步

　　Chinas central bank has liberalised lending rates.Does it matter?

　　中國的央行放開了借貸利率，這有用嗎?

　　NOBODY can accuse the Peoples Bank of China , Chinas central bank, of beinggun-shy. A few weeks ago its clumsy attempt to restrain dodgier forms of bank lending ledto a bout of market panic. Many said the episode would chill enthusiasm for furtherexperimentation.

　　沒人能指責作為中國央行的中國人民銀行行動慎重。幾周之前，央行笨拙地試探了收緊銀行貸款，這引起了市場的一陣恐慌。許多人表示這會降低進一步作出改革的熱情。

　　But on July 20th the PBOC experimented again. On that day the central bank ended allrestrictions on lending rates, which previously had a floor of 70% of the PBOC benchmarkrate. Banks are now free to set lending rates at anylevel they want.

　　但是在7月20日的時候，中國人民銀行又做出了改革。當天，央行放開了借貸利率的限制，之前的標準是借貸利率不得低于央行標準額的0.7倍。現(xiàn)在銀行可以自由設(shè)定貸款利率了。對住房抵押貸款的人來說是好消息。

　　In truth, the measure is less bold than it appears. The interest-rate reform that everyone iswaiting for is liberalisation of deposit rates. Chinas policy of financial repression has cappedthe rate that banks can pay depositors, even as it put a floor on the rate at which they mustlend. That has guaranteed fat profits for the big state banks, like Bank of China and theIndustrial and Commercial Bank of China, that dominate the financial system.

　　事實上，這個措施沒有看起來那么大膽。人們想要的利率改革是存款利率的放開。中國的金融壓制政策限定了銀行給存款者的最高利率，正如也設(shè)定了貸款利率一樣。這個政策保證了大型國有銀行，例如中國銀行，中國工商銀行的豐厚利潤，同時他們也主導了金融體系。

　　The liberalisation of lending rates may be a half-measure, but officials still hope it willincrease competition among banks and spur lending to the corporate sector, especially toprivate firms that have long been starved of capital. Sceptics point out that the PBOC movedthe floor for the lending rate from 90% of its benchmark to 70% a year ago, but Chinesebanks did not rush to lend below the 90% mark. That suggests they are unlikely to cut ratesnow.

　　放開貸款利率只算是半個措施。但是官方依然希望這會增加銀行間的競爭，促進資金流向企業(yè)部門，尤其是長期缺乏資金的私人公司。懷疑者指出一年前中國人民銀行將貸款利率的下限由基準利率的90%下調(diào)到70%，而中國的銀行并沒有馬上做出調(diào)整。那意味著銀行并不想馬上下調(diào)利率。

　　A rival view argues that borrowers with strong bargaining power, such as big state-ownedenterprises , will now be emboldened to push the big banks for cheaper loans. Somesuggest that non-performing loans at SOEs may be rolled over at negligible interest rates,disguising what is, in effect, a state bail-out.

　　相反的觀點是借貸者議價能力很強，像一些大型的國有企業(yè)，他們現(xiàn)在會有膽量讓銀行調(diào)低利率。一些人表示國企的不良貸款會延期償還，利率也會很低，實際上相當于國家紓困。

　　On this view, as lower rates eat into their profits the big banks will be forced to look forhigher-margin opportunities at the small and medium-sized private firms that they havelong ignored. That in turn will put them in direct competition with smaller, private-sectorjoint-stock banks, such as China Merchants and China Minsheng, that have focused on thisarea.

　　從這個角度看，低利率會啃食大型銀行的利潤，他們會將目光轉(zhuǎn)移到長期忽視的中小企業(yè)身上，貸款給這些企業(yè)利潤更高。這會使他們與長期參與中小企業(yè)貸款的小型私營股份制銀行產(chǎn)生直接競爭，比如中國招商銀行，中國民生銀行。

　　If so, Chinas banks may be about to enter a rocky period. ChinaScope Financial, a researchfirm, has analysed how increased competition and declining net interest margins willaffect banks operating in China. The boffins conclude that the smallest local outfits, knownas city commercial banks, and the middling private-sector banks will be hit hardest, but thatreturns on equity at the big five state banks will also be squeezed . They think theindustry will need $50 billion-100 billion in extra capital over the next two years to keep itscapital ratios stable.

　　這樣的話，中國的銀行可能會進入動蕩期。數(shù)庫財務(wù)咨詢有限公司分析了競爭的增加和凈利息差幅的減少會影響中國銀行的運行。研究人員得出結(jié)論：小型的地方商業(yè)銀行和中等私營股份制銀行最慘，五大行的權(quán)益回報率也會壓縮。他們認為接下來的兩年中，銀行業(yè)需要500億到1000億美元的額外資金保證其資本比率穩(wěn)定。

　　The bigger worry for Chinas state banks is the signal sent by the PBOCs move. The centralbank has affirmed its commitment to reform. If those reforms include the liberalisation ofdeposit rates, then something far more serious than a minor profit squeeze will befallChinas banks. Guaranteed profitability would end; banks would have to compete forcustomers; and risk management would suddenly matter. In short, Chinese bankers wouldhave to start working for a living.

　　中國國有銀行最大的擔憂是央行的行動所發(fā)出的信號。央行確認要進行改革。如果改革措施包括放開存款利率，那么中國銀行業(yè)會面臨一個比利潤壓縮更嚴重的危機。收益保證將會終結(jié)。銀行需要爭奪客戶，風險管理突然變得很重要。總而言之，中國的銀行從業(yè)人員需要認真干活了。