Foreigninterventions;When to hold and when to fold

　　來自外國的干擾; 來自外國的干擾究竟該如何進退

　　Can Intervention Work? By Rory Stewart andGerald Knaus.

　　《干預有用嗎?》Rory Steward, Gerald Knaus合著。

　　Can we intervene in foreign countries and dogood? Can we stop wars and genocides and get ridof evil dictators? Can we then build modern,democratic states that thrive in our wake? Theanswer depends on who you ask. An anti-Qaddafi Libyan will have nice things to say aboutNATO s role there right now. But you will get very different views from an Afghan, an Iraqi, aBosnian or a Kosovar.

　　我們有權干預外國嗎?我們的干預真的有利嗎?我們能夠阻止戰爭和屠殺嗎?我們能夠消滅掉那些邪惡的獨裁者嗎?我們能夠激發他們的斗志，促使他們建造一個現代的民主國家嗎?這些答案因人而異。談起北約在推翻其政權中起到的重要作用，一個反對利比亞卡扎菲政權的人立即就滔滔不絕。但是如果你問一個阿富汗人，伊拉克人，波斯尼亞或是科索沃人，得到的答案就會大不相同。

　　Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus are well placed to pose and answer these questions. BeforeMr Stewart became a Conservative MP, he was a deputy governor of two Iraqi provinces. Healso walked across Afghanistan and wrote a bestseller about the experience. Mr Knaus, apolitical economist, runs the European Stability Initiative, a Berlin-based think-tank foundedin Sarajevo in 1999, which has been particularly influential in the Balkans.

　　Rory Stewart 和 Gerald Knaus根據自身的經歷，給出了合宜的答案。在Stewart成為一個保守黨議員之前，他曾擔任過伊拉克兩個省的省長。他還曾橫穿阿富汗，將自己的經歷寫成了書，并成為了暢銷書。Knaus則是一名政治經濟學家，他管理一家位于柏林的智庫，叫作歐洲穩定計劃。其于1999年創建于薩拉熱窩，在巴爾干半島各國特別有影響力。

　　The book is structured as two essays with a lengthy joint introduction. Mr Stewart haswritten a colourful account of his time in Afghanistan and his failed attempts to stop what hesees as a self- defeating build-up of ambitions, troops and plans. He skewers gobbledygooknotions of bringing Afghans accountable governance and Western-style rule of law. It is notthat he is against such things, but that he doubts the ability of foreigners to impose it all. Hecites a pragmatic admonition from English Mountain Rescue: Be prepared to turn back ifconditions turn against you.

　　本書由2片論文及一篇很長的合序構成。Stewart描繪了他在阿富汗時多姿多彩的生活，也寫了他對阿富汗一系列的雄心壯志，軍隊的建立以及計劃的制定的看法，認為這都是自拆臺腳，他想要阻止卻未能成功。他竭力譏諷那些官腔，說什么建立一個可信賴的阿富汗政府，引進西方式法治。他并不是反對這些做法，而是質疑外國人的執行力。他在此引用了英國高山救援隊的一條樸實的警告;如情況不利，請準備回程。

　　Writing about Bosnia, Mr Knaus deploys heavy artillery in arguments that he has madebefore. Intervention there has been a stunning success, he says, given the state of Bosnia atthe end of its devastating war in 1995. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned,not a single intervening soldier was killed , and today s problems are of theconventional political sort, not the kind that herald another war. Not only does Bosnia enjoyfree and fair elections, but also it has relatively little crime. Mr Knaus argues that the onlymissteps came from assumptions held by those like Lord Ashdown, when he was de factogovernor of Bosnia, that well-meaning envoys could behave like imperial viceroys, sackingelected yet obstructive leaders at will.

　　談到波斯尼亞時，Knaus大量引用了他之前發表的觀點，火力十足。鑒于那場1995年波斯尼亞發生的殘酷的戰爭的結局，干預確實取得了驚人的成功，他說。成百上千的難民都回歸故土，且沒有一個外來士兵死于戰后重建工作中。但是今天的問題是常規政治，并非預示著另一場戰爭的那種。不僅波斯尼亞有了公平自由的選舉，而且犯罪也相對減少。Knaus認為，唯一的錯處在于阿什當勛爵等人的錯誤假設。阿什當勛爵為波西尼亞實際領導人時，滿懷善意的使者卻能像帝國總督那樣，任意將選舉出來卻礙手礙腳的領導人撤職。

　　From rather successful interventions, defined as Bosnia and Kosovo, the authors convey animportant lesson: that is, the experience garnered in one place is generally not much useelsewhere. Bosnia was a success because the intervention came as part of the 1995 Daytonpeace agreement, which ended the war and which all the exhausted sides committedthemselves to. In Kosovo the vast majority of its peopleethnic Albanians, nearly all ofthem Muslimswere very grateful for what they saw as their America-led liberation fromthe Serbs. Mr Knaus also argues that the United Nations war-crimes tribunal was vital as aform of closure and for removing from the political scene characters such as Ratko Mladic, aBosnian Serb general now on trial for genocide in The Hague.

　　從波斯尼亞、科索沃等干預的成功案例中，作者得出了一個重要的結論，那就是，從一處獲得的經驗多數時候在其他地方并不管用。波斯尼亞干預的成功是因對其干預是作為1995年代頓和平協議中的一部分提出的，協議旨在結束戰爭，而精疲力竭的雙方也都愿意遵守。而在科索沃，大多數國民為阿爾巴尼亞人，幾乎所有人都是穆斯林，他們十分感激美國領導他們從塞爾維亞人手中解放。Knaus還談到，聯合國軍事法庭對于消滅拉特科穆拉迪克這樣的人至關重要。Ratko Mladic是波斯尼亞的塞爾維亞將軍，如今因涉嫌種族滅絕而在海牙國家法庭受審。

　　So, does intervention work? As any Bosnian peasant may tell you, maybe yes, maybe no.It depends on the circumstances and requires modest ambitions. Muddle through with asense of purpose, says Mr Knaus. Do what you can, where you can and no more, agrees MrStewart. In policy terms that sounds a bit like yes to Libya, no to Syria and so on.

　　那么，干預究竟是否有用呢?隨便哪個波斯尼亞的農民都會這樣告訴你，可能有用吧，也可能沒用。它取決于現實情況，并且人們的目標也要合理。有目標地混日子，Knaus如是說道。你想做就做，能做就做，沒別的了，Stewart以此表示贊成。從政策的角度來看，這似乎是在對利比亞稱好，對敘利亞搖頭之類的。

　　Foreigninterventions;When to hold and when to fold

　　來自外國的干擾; 來自外國的干擾究竟該如何進退

　　Can Intervention Work? By Rory Stewart andGerald Knaus.

　　《干預有用嗎?》Rory Steward, Gerald Knaus合著。

　　Can we intervene in foreign countries and dogood? Can we stop wars and genocides and get ridof evil dictators? Can we then build modern,democratic states that thrive in our wake? Theanswer depends on who you ask. An anti-Qaddafi Libyan will have nice things to say aboutNATO s role there right now. But you will get very different views from an Afghan, an Iraqi, aBosnian or a Kosovar.

　　我們有權干預外國嗎?我們的干預真的有利嗎?我們能夠阻止戰爭和屠殺嗎?我們能夠消滅掉那些邪惡的獨裁者嗎?我們能夠激發他們的斗志，促使他們建造一個現代的民主國家嗎?這些答案因人而異。談起北約在推翻其政權中起到的重要作用，一個反對利比亞卡扎菲政權的人立即就滔滔不絕。但是如果你問一個阿富汗人，伊拉克人，波斯尼亞或是科索沃人，得到的答案就會大不相同。

　　Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus are well placed to pose and answer these questions. BeforeMr Stewart became a Conservative MP, he was a deputy governor of two Iraqi provinces. Healso walked across Afghanistan and wrote a bestseller about the experience. Mr Knaus, apolitical economist, runs the European Stability Initiative, a Berlin-based think-tank foundedin Sarajevo in 1999, which has been particularly influential in the Balkans.

　　Rory Stewart 和 Gerald Knaus根據自身的經歷，給出了合宜的答案。在Stewart成為一個保守黨議員之前，他曾擔任過伊拉克兩個省的省長。他還曾橫穿阿富汗，將自己的經歷寫成了書，并成為了暢銷書。Knaus則是一名政治經濟學家，他管理一家位于柏林的智庫，叫作歐洲穩定計劃。其于1999年創建于薩拉熱窩，在巴爾干半島各國特別有影響力。

　　The book is structured as two essays with a lengthy joint introduction. Mr Stewart haswritten a colourful account of his time in Afghanistan and his failed attempts to stop what hesees as a self- defeating build-up of ambitions, troops and plans. He skewers gobbledygooknotions of bringing Afghans accountable governance and Western-style rule of law. It is notthat he is against such things, but that he doubts the ability of foreigners to impose it all. Hecites a pragmatic admonition from English Mountain Rescue: Be prepared to turn back ifconditions turn against you.

　　本書由2片論文及一篇很長的合序構成。Stewart描繪了他在阿富汗時多姿多彩的生活，也寫了他對阿富汗一系列的雄心壯志，軍隊的建立以及計劃的制定的看法，認為這都是自拆臺腳，他想要阻止卻未能成功。他竭力譏諷那些官腔，說什么建立一個可信賴的阿富汗政府，引進西方式法治。他并不是反對這些做法，而是質疑外國人的執行力。他在此引用了英國高山救援隊的一條樸實的警告;如情況不利，請準備回程。

　　Writing about Bosnia, Mr Knaus deploys heavy artillery in arguments that he has madebefore. Intervention there has been a stunning success, he says, given the state of Bosnia atthe end of its devastating war in 1995. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned,not a single intervening soldier was killed , and today s problems are of theconventional political sort, not the kind that herald another war. Not only does Bosnia enjoyfree and fair elections, but also it has relatively little crime. Mr Knaus argues that the onlymissteps came from assumptions held by those like Lord Ashdown, when he was de factogovernor of Bosnia, that well-meaning envoys could behave like imperial viceroys, sackingelected yet obstructive leaders at will.

　　談到波斯尼亞時，Knaus大量引用了他之前發表的觀點，火力十足。鑒于那場1995年波斯尼亞發生的殘酷的戰爭的結局，干預確實取得了驚人的成功，他說。成百上千的難民都回歸故土，且沒有一個外來士兵死于戰后重建工作中。但是今天的問題是常規政治，并非預示著另一場戰爭的那種。不僅波斯尼亞有了公平自由的選舉，而且犯罪也相對減少。Knaus認為，唯一的錯處在于阿什當勛爵等人的錯誤假設。阿什當勛爵為波西尼亞實際領導人時，滿懷善意的使者卻能像帝國總督那樣，任意將選舉出來卻礙手礙腳的領導人撤職。

　　From rather successful interventions, defined as Bosnia and Kosovo, the authors convey animportant lesson: that is, the experience garnered in one place is generally not much useelsewhere. Bosnia was a success because the intervention came as part of the 1995 Daytonpeace agreement, which ended the war and which all the exhausted sides committedthemselves to. In Kosovo the vast majority of its peopleethnic Albanians, nearly all ofthem Muslimswere very grateful for what they saw as their America-led liberation fromthe Serbs. Mr Knaus also argues that the United Nations war-crimes tribunal was vital as aform of closure and for removing from the political scene characters such as Ratko Mladic, aBosnian Serb general now on trial for genocide in The Hague.

　　從波斯尼亞、科索沃等干預的成功案例中，作者得出了一個重要的結論，那就是，從一處獲得的經驗多數時候在其他地方并不管用。波斯尼亞干預的成功是因對其干預是作為1995年代頓和平協議中的一部分提出的，協議旨在結束戰爭，而精疲力竭的雙方也都愿意遵守。而在科索沃，大多數國民為阿爾巴尼亞人，幾乎所有人都是穆斯林，他們十分感激美國領導他們從塞爾維亞人手中解放。Knaus還談到，聯合國軍事法庭對于消滅拉特科穆拉迪克這樣的人至關重要。Ratko Mladic是波斯尼亞的塞爾維亞將軍，如今因涉嫌種族滅絕而在海牙國家法庭受審。

　　So, does intervention work? As any Bosnian peasant may tell you, maybe yes, maybe no.It depends on the circumstances and requires modest ambitions. Muddle through with asense of purpose, says Mr Knaus. Do what you can, where you can and no more, agrees MrStewart. In policy terms that sounds a bit like yes to Libya, no to Syria and so on.

　　那么，干預究竟是否有用呢?隨便哪個波斯尼亞的農民都會這樣告訴你，可能有用吧，也可能沒用。它取決于現實情況，并且人們的目標也要合理。有目標地混日子，Knaus如是說道。你想做就做，能做就做，沒別的了，Stewart以此表示贊成。從政策的角度來看，這似乎是在對利比亞稱好，對敘利亞搖頭之類的。