Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, one country more than any other has provided the “heavy lifting” to support global economic growth. That country is China, the world’s second-biggest economy. The most compelling piece of evidence comes from China’s balance of payments position. In 2007, China posted a current account surplus the equivalent of 10.1 per cent of gross domestic product. Last year, the surplus was down to a mere 2.1 per cent of GDP.

自2008年全球金融危機爆發以來，在拉動全球經濟增長方面，有一個國家“挑起的重擔”超過了其他任何一個國家。這個國家就是世界上第二大經濟體——中國。最具說服力的證據，來自中國的國際收支狀況。2007年，中國的經常賬戶盈余相當于國內生產總值(GDP)的10.1%。去年，這個比例下降到只有2.1%。

This adjustment — enormous in the history of such things — occurred for two key reasons.

從歷史上來看，這樣的變化是非常大的。出現這一變化有兩個主要原因：

? First, in the light of faltering export growth, Beijing shifted towards a “domestic demand first” policy, thanks to massive stimulus of infrastructure investment. Total investment spending rose from 41 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 47 per cent in 2024. Domestic investment thus rose relative to domestic savings, thereby reducing net capital account outflows.

首先，鑒于出口增長疲弱，中國政府借助大規模刺激措施，即大量增加基礎設施投資，轉向了“內需第一”的政策。總投資支出占GDP的比例從2007年的41%，升至2024年的47%。因此，國內投資相對于國內儲蓄出現了上升，從而減少了資本賬戶凈流出。

? Second, despite softening exports, Beijing tolerated continuous currency appreciation. In effect, the rest of the world devalued against the renminbi. Put another way, the combination of an ever-strengthening renminbi and, by international standards, a relatively high inflation rate left China nursing significant competitiveness losses even as others made competitive gains.

其次，盡管出口不景氣，中國政府容忍了人民幣的持續升值。實際上，世界其他地區的貨幣相對人民幣都出現了貶值。換句話說，不斷升值的人民幣，加上相對較高的通脹率(以國際標準衡量)，使中國競爭力出現大幅下滑，而其他國家的競爭力上升。

Take these two factors together and it is clear that, in recent years, China was the world’s “consumer of last resort”, a role more traditionally played by the US. As many other nations — particularly the US and much of Europe — embarked on a “great deleveraging”, Beijing provided the counterweight. As others saved, China borrowed — most obviously through a rapid expansion of so-called shadow banking.

綜合以上兩個因素，明顯可以看出，近年來，中國成了世界的“最后的消費者”，而傳統上這一角色更多是由美國扮演。隨著其他許多經濟體——尤其是美國和歐洲部分地區——開啟“大規模去杠桿”，北京方面起到了平衡的作用。其他國家獲救了，但中國卻負債累累——最明顯的是影子銀行迅速擴張所帶來的債務膨脹。

Had China not performed this role, the world would have faced a far greater crisis.

如果中國沒有扮演這樣的角色，世界面臨的危機可能要嚴重得多。

Imagine that Chinese infrastructure investment had not surged. Commodity prices would not have recovered in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis. Many emerging nations would have found themselves short of export revenues and, in some cases, faced with immediate balance-of-payments crises.

想象一下，如果中國沒有大幅增加基礎設施投資會怎樣?那么，在金融危機后，大宗商品價格就不會快速回升。許多新興國家會發現本國缺少出口收入，而且在某些情況下，直接面臨著國際收支危機。

Or imagine the renminbi had not soared. The rest of the world would not have devalued, monetary conditions for many countries would have been tighter and, as a result, global deflationary pressures would have been far more intense than they have proved to be.

再想象一下，如果人民幣沒有大幅升值，結果又會怎樣?世界其他地區的貨幣就不會貶值，許多國家的貨幣環境會比現在更加緊縮，結果是，全球通縮壓力將會比實際情況嚴重得多。

So China has been the shock absorber for the global economy, a punch bag seemingly able to soak up the recessionary blows that would otherwise have derailed global growth.

所以說，中國充當了全球經濟的減震器，像一個沙袋，似乎能夠吸收那些本可能阻礙全球增長的衰退沖擊。

Playing the punchbag role has, however, left the country’s economy vulnerable. One simple way to demonstrate this is via changes in consensus expectations for Chinese economic growth. Since 2010, initial growth expectations have simply been too high, a trend that has become worryingly entrenched as the renminbi has strengthened.

然而，扮演沙袋角色使中國經濟變得脆弱。要證明這一點，一個簡單方法是觀察對中國經濟增長的普遍預期的變化。自2010年以后，增長預期一開始就有點過高，而隨著人民幣走強，這一趨勢變得穩固得令人擔憂。

Unfortunately, China’s role as a “stabiliser” for the global economy has contributed to instability within the country itself: an overheated property market, a substantial increase in indebtedness, a roller-coaster ride for the stock market and a declining marginal rate of return on capital spending. So the People’s Bank of China’s actions in the second week of August — interpreted variously as either the beginnings of a major devaluation or a modest market-led adjustment — might be regarded instead as part of an attempt to shift the balance of risks away from China back to the rest of the world.

不幸的是，中國承擔全球經濟“穩定器”的角色已經導致本國內部的不穩定：過熱的房地產市場、負債大幅增加、股市過山車般暴漲暴跌，以及資本支出邊際回報率下降。因此，中國央行在今年8月第二周采取的舉措——被解讀為要么是大幅貶值的開始，要么是適度的市場導向調整——或許可以視為是中國要讓風險平衡從本國重新回到世界其他地區的嘗試的一部分。

After all, no economy can forever be a shock absorber. The last decade has shown that: the US bumped into the subprime crisis, the eurozone periphery ended up with a series of sovereign bond crises and Greece ultimately suffered an economic collapse on a par with the Great Depression.

畢竟，任何經濟體都不可能永遠充當減震器。過去十年的經歷表明了這一點：美國發生了次貸危機，歐元區外圍國家接連遭遇主權債務危機，希臘最終陷入了一場不亞于“大蕭條”(Great Depression)的經濟危機。

China’s currency actions should be seen in this light. The last thing it now needs is a further appreciation of the real exchange rate. To countenance an additional upward move would potentially create imbalances reminiscent of those the European periphery saw in the years before the onset of the 2010-2024 eurozone crisis.

應該從這個角度來看待中國的匯率調整舉措。中國現在最不需要的就是人民幣實際匯率的進一步升值。容許人民幣繼續上行有可能會導致失衡，就好比歐元區外圍國家在2010年至2024年歐元區危機爆發前幾年的情形一樣。

This implies that the global economy may need a new shock absorber. Many have pinned their hopes on a sustained US recovery yet, to date, any acceleration in growth has been, to say the least, modest. Moreover, if the Federal Reserve decides to raise interest rates before the year is out, the US economy’s ability to act as a shock absorber may be compromised.

這意味著，全球經濟可能需要一個新的減震器。許多人寄望于美國經濟持續復蘇，然而迄今為止，美國經濟增長并未顯著提速。此外，如果美聯儲(Fed)決定在年底前加息，美國經濟充當減震器的能力可能打折扣。

The alternative is for the US dollar — rather than the economy — to play the role. China may not have intended to fire a shot across the Fed’s bows but the warning is clear: should the Fed choose to raise interest rates alongside a new “market-led” attitude from Beijing, the danger is that the dollar could climb into the stratosphere. Under those circumstances, we could see collapsing emerging market currencies, a currency-led tightening of US monetary conditions and an American recovery that all too quickly melts away. From a global perspective, it would make more sense for the Fed to leave monetary policy on hold.

另一種選擇是讓美元(而非美國經濟)扮演這種角色。中國或許并非有意向美聯儲發出警告，但其中的警示意味卻很明顯：如果美聯儲選擇加息，再加上北京方面的“市場導向”新態度，美元匯率很可能大幅攀升。在那種情況下，我們可能看到新興市場貨幣崩潰，美國貨幣環境因匯率因素所致的緊縮，以及很快煙消云散的美國經濟復蘇。從全球角度來看，美聯儲保持貨幣政策不變更明智。

It is easy to criticise China’s internal imbalances. But failing to take into account the role these played in stabilising the global economy is a major mistake. It doubtless makes sense for China now to address its imbalances. Yet, as it does so, the rest of the world will need to find a new shock absorber. It’s not at all obvious whether any economy is up to the task.

批評中國內部失衡是很容易的。但如果不考慮這些失衡在穩定全球經濟中的作用，那將是大錯。中國現在解決其失衡問題無疑是明智的。然而，在中國這么做的時候，全球其他地區將需要找到一個新的減震器。是否有經濟體可以擔此重任，現在還一點都不明顯。

---------金融時報：哈薩克斯坦放開匯率致堅

Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, one country more than any other has provided the “heavy lifting” to support global economic growth. That country is China, the world’s second-biggest economy. The most compelling piece of evidence comes from China’s balance of payments position. In 2007, China posted a current account surplus the equivalent of 10.1 per cent of gross domestic product. Last year, the surplus was down to a mere 2.1 per cent of GDP.

自2008年全球金融危機爆發以來，在拉動全球經濟增長方面，有一個國家“挑起的重擔”超過了其他任何一個國家。這個國家就是世界上第二大經濟體——中國。最具說服力的證據，來自中國的國際收支狀況。2007年，中國的經常賬戶盈余相當于國內生產總值(GDP)的10.1%。去年，這個比例下降到只有2.1%。

This adjustment — enormous in the history of such things — occurred for two key reasons.

從歷史上來看，這樣的變化是非常大的。出現這一變化有兩個主要原因：

? First, in the light of faltering export growth, Beijing shifted towards a “domestic demand first” policy, thanks to massive stimulus of infrastructure investment. Total investment spending rose from 41 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 47 per cent in 2024. Domestic investment thus rose relative to domestic savings, thereby reducing net capital account outflows.

首先，鑒于出口增長疲弱，中國政府借助大規模刺激措施，即大量增加基礎設施投資，轉向了“內需第一”的政策。總投資支出占GDP的比例從2007年的41%，升至2024年的47%。因此，國內投資相對于國內儲蓄出現了上升，從而減少了資本賬戶凈流出。

? Second, despite softening exports, Beijing tolerated continuous currency appreciation. In effect, the rest of the world devalued against the renminbi. Put another way, the combination of an ever-strengthening renminbi and, by international standards, a relatively high inflation rate left China nursing significant competitiveness losses even as others made competitive gains.

其次，盡管出口不景氣，中國政府容忍了人民幣的持續升值。實際上，世界其他地區的貨幣相對人民幣都出現了貶值。換句話說，不斷升值的人民幣，加上相對較高的通脹率(以國際標準衡量)，使中國競爭力出現大幅下滑，而其他國家的競爭力上升。

Take these two factors together and it is clear that, in recent years, China was the world’s “consumer of last resort”, a role more traditionally played by the US. As many other nations — particularly the US and much of Europe — embarked on a “great deleveraging”, Beijing provided the counterweight. As others saved, China borrowed — most obviously through a rapid expansion of so-called shadow banking.

綜合以上兩個因素，明顯可以看出，近年來，中國成了世界的“最后的消費者”，而傳統上這一角色更多是由美國扮演。隨著其他許多經濟體——尤其是美國和歐洲部分地區——開啟“大規模去杠桿”，北京方面起到了平衡的作用。其他國家獲救了，但中國卻負債累累——最明顯的是影子銀行迅速擴張所帶來的債務膨脹。

Had China not performed this role, the world would have faced a far greater crisis.

如果中國沒有扮演這樣的角色，世界面臨的危機可能要嚴重得多。

Imagine that Chinese infrastructure investment had not surged. Commodity prices would not have recovered in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis. Many emerging nations would have found themselves short of export revenues and, in some cases, faced with immediate balance-of-payments crises.

想象一下，如果中國沒有大幅增加基礎設施投資會怎樣?那么，在金融危機后，大宗商品價格就不會快速回升。許多新興國家會發現本國缺少出口收入，而且在某些情況下，直接面臨著國際收支危機。

Or imagine the renminbi had not soared. The rest of the world would not have devalued, monetary conditions for many countries would have been tighter and, as a result, global deflationary pressures would have been far more intense than they have proved to be.

再想象一下，如果人民幣沒有大幅升值，結果又會怎樣?世界其他地區的貨幣就不會貶值，許多國家的貨幣環境會比現在更加緊縮，結果是，全球通縮壓力將會比實際情況嚴重得多。

So China has been the shock absorber for the global economy, a punch bag seemingly able to soak up the recessionary blows that would otherwise have derailed global growth.

所以說，中國充當了全球經濟的減震器，像一個沙袋，似乎能夠吸收那些本可能阻礙全球增長的衰退沖擊。

Playing the punchbag role has, however, left the country’s economy vulnerable. One simple way to demonstrate this is via changes in consensus expectations for Chinese economic growth. Since 2010, initial growth expectations have simply been too high, a trend that has become worryingly entrenched as the renminbi has strengthened.

然而，扮演沙袋角色使中國經濟變得脆弱。要證明這一點，一個簡單方法是觀察對中國經濟增長的普遍預期的變化。自2010年以后，增長預期一開始就有點過高，而隨著人民幣走強，這一趨勢變得穩固得令人擔憂。

Unfortunately, China’s role as a “stabiliser” for the global economy has contributed to instability within the country itself: an overheated property market, a substantial increase in indebtedness, a roller-coaster ride for the stock market and a declining marginal rate of return on capital spending. So the People’s Bank of China’s actions in the second week of August — interpreted variously as either the beginnings of a major devaluation or a modest market-led adjustment — might be regarded instead as part of an attempt to shift the balance of risks away from China back to the rest of the world.

不幸的是，中國承擔全球經濟“穩定器”的角色已經導致本國內部的不穩定：過熱的房地產市場、負債大幅增加、股市過山車般暴漲暴跌，以及資本支出邊際回報率下降。因此，中國央行在今年8月第二周采取的舉措——被解讀為要么是大幅貶值的開始，要么是適度的市場導向調整——或許可以視為是中國要讓風險平衡從本國重新回到世界其他地區的嘗試的一部分。

After all, no economy can forever be a shock absorber. The last decade has shown that: the US bumped into the subprime crisis, the eurozone periphery ended up with a series of sovereign bond crises and Greece ultimately suffered an economic collapse on a par with the Great Depression.

畢竟，任何經濟體都不可能永遠充當減震器。過去十年的經歷表明了這一點：美國發生了次貸危機，歐元區外圍國家接連遭遇主權債務危機，希臘最終陷入了一場不亞于“大蕭條”(Great Depression)的經濟危機。

China’s currency actions should be seen in this light. The last thing it now needs is a further appreciation of the real exchange rate. To countenance an additional upward move would potentially create imbalances reminiscent of those the European periphery saw in the years before the onset of the 2010-2024 eurozone crisis.

應該從這個角度來看待中國的匯率調整舉措。中國現在最不需要的就是人民幣實際匯率的進一步升值。容許人民幣繼續上行有可能會導致失衡，就好比歐元區外圍國家在2010年至2024年歐元區危機爆發前幾年的情形一樣。

This implies that the global economy may need a new shock absorber. Many have pinned their hopes on a sustained US recovery yet, to date, any acceleration in growth has been, to say the least, modest. Moreover, if the Federal Reserve decides to raise interest rates before the year is out, the US economy’s ability to act as a shock absorber may be compromised.

這意味著，全球經濟可能需要一個新的減震器。許多人寄望于美國經濟持續復蘇，然而迄今為止，美國經濟增長并未顯著提速。此外，如果美聯儲(Fed)決定在年底前加息，美國經濟充當減震器的能力可能打折扣。

The alternative is for the US dollar — rather than the economy — to play the role. China may not have intended to fire a shot across the Fed’s bows but the warning is clear: should the Fed choose to raise interest rates alongside a new “market-led” attitude from Beijing, the danger is that the dollar could climb into the stratosphere. Under those circumstances, we could see collapsing emerging market currencies, a currency-led tightening of US monetary conditions and an American recovery that all too quickly melts away. From a global perspective, it would make more sense for the Fed to leave monetary policy on hold.

另一種選擇是讓美元(而非美國經濟)扮演這種角色。中國或許并非有意向美聯儲發出警告，但其中的警示意味卻很明顯：如果美聯儲選擇加息，再加上北京方面的“市場導向”新態度，美元匯率很可能大幅攀升。在那種情況下，我們可能看到新興市場貨幣崩潰，美國貨幣環境因匯率因素所致的緊縮，以及很快煙消云散的美國經濟復蘇。從全球角度來看，美聯儲保持貨幣政策不變更明智。

It is easy to criticise China’s internal imbalances. But failing to take into account the role these played in stabilising the global economy is a major mistake. It doubtless makes sense for China now to address its imbalances. Yet, as it does so, the rest of the world will need to find a new shock absorber. It’s not at all obvious whether any economy is up to the task.

批評中國內部失衡是很容易的。但如果不考慮這些失衡在穩定全球經濟中的作用，那將是大錯。中國現在解決其失衡問題無疑是明智的。然而，在中國這么做的時候，全球其他地區將需要找到一個新的減震器。是否有經濟體可以擔此重任，現在還一點都不明顯。

---------金融時報：哈薩克斯坦放開匯率致堅